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A.m. ». o. 

Til "E ^ IS ^ 
IX jBi el la isl 

EX 

RATIOMLIPHILOSOPHIA 

QUAS 

IN GEORGIOPOIITANO COLLEGIO, D. C. 

J. O'CALLAGHAN, G. M. SmTH, 
G. W. FUL]\IEK, P. DOWD 

Sive latine sive anglice turn evolvendas turn propugnandas 
suscipiunt, 

DIE 11 JULII ANNO 1853. 



Facta cuilibet arguendi interrogandique copia. 



A. m. ». G. 






OP 



RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, 

Explained and defended in Latin 
or English 



Messrs. Joseph O^Callaghan, William M. Smithy 
George W, FuVmer and Patrich Doivd^ 

IN GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, D. C, 

JULY nth, 1853. 



Anyone of the audience may object or interrogate. 



THESES 

EX 

t ^i8& 



I. 

Veritas logica ea mentis operatioue adtequate continetur, 
qufe judicium vulgo^appellatur, licet cum simplici apprehen- 
sioni, turn seiisibus ipsis aliqua ratione convenire possit. 

II. 

Certitudinem metaphysicam physicam et moraleni eius- 

modi esse constat, ut non modo differant inter se, verum 

etiam alia aliis sit praestantior, sieae non quoad partem 

veluti negativam, et exclusionem dubii, sed quoad perfe- 

ctionem positivam, ex qua ilia exclusio emergit, aspician- 

tur. 

III. 

Media ad verum attingendum iuxta obiectorum numerum 
iveet d ad hcEc rsitatem quinque commode reduci possunt: 



THESES 

OF 



Logical truth is fully contained in that operation of the 
mind which is commonly called judgment, although it 
may in a certain sense be attributed not only to simple 
apprehension, but also to the senses. 

II. 

The three species of certitude, metaphysical, physical, 
and moral,considered not negatively, i. e. so far as they ex- 
clude doubt, but positively, in so far as they express the 
force of the motive which compels us to assent, not only 
differ from each other, but have different degrees of 
excellence. 

III. 

The means of arriving at truth, according to the various 
classes of objects, can be e^-sily reduced to these five, viz : 



6 

uimirum conscientiam, internam et externam eensibilitateiiij 
intelligentiam, ratiocinationem, et auctoritatem. 



IV. 



Conscientiam vere ac certe referre adfectiones nobis in- 
ternas, ipsumque subjectiim cogitans, est factum aliquod 
primitivum per se manifestum, de quo nemo dubitare po- 
test quin dubitationem ipsam dubitando destruat. 



Sensiles facultates, dum sint rite dispositse recteque adhi- 
bitas circa obiecta ad se pertinentia, errori non esse subiec- 
tas natura ipsa duce ac magistra colligimus. 



VI. 



Veracitas intelligentite adeo firma rataque per se est, ut, 
hoc ipso quod in dubium vocari velit, detegatur. 

VII. 

Posita intelligentige veracitate, veracitatem etiam ratioci- 
nationis admittas oportet, utpote qua3 ab ilia pendet. 



VIII. 



Humana auctoritas in i^efacti generatim inspecta etsi ple- 
na non sit ut norma approbatione digna quam in operando 
sequamur iure habetur, eaque si omnem exceptionem supe- 
ret plenaque sit indubiam parit certitudinem. 



conscience, internal and external sensibility, intelligence, 
ratiocination and authority. 

IV. 

That conscience truly and certainly makes known to us 
our internal affections and the thinking principle itself; is a 
primitive self-evident fact of which no one can doubt with- 
out destroying his doubt by the doubt itself 



That the sensible faculties, when they are well disposed 
and rightly applied to their proper objects, are not subject 
to error, we gather from the guidance and teaching of na- 
ture itself. 



VI. 



The veracity of intelligence is of itself so firm and im- 
movable, that by the very act of denying, we assert it. 

VII. 

If we admit intelligence to be a means of arriving at truth, 
we must also admit the veracity of ratiocination, as depend- 
ing upon it. 



VIII. 



Human authority, in matter of fact, even when not full 
and complete, is justly considered a rule which we may safely 
follow in acting ; but Avhen full and above all exceptions, it 
brings with it undoubted certainty. 



8 

IX. 

Communis naturje seusus, utpote qiii a natura rationali 
ortum ducit, tale sortitur principium, quod labi revera non 
potest 

X. 

Motivum, quo mens vero adhserere cogitur in evidentia 
coUocatur quag tota quanta est in nexu per nos consistit qui 
sive inter unius veritatis elementa, sive inter plures verita- 
tes intercedere perspiciatur. 



XL 



Hinc aliam esse objectivam ut aiunt, aliam subjectivam, 
aliam metapliysicam, aliam physicam, aliam moralem, 
aliam immediatam, aliam mediatam esse evidentiam dig- 
noscere pronum est. 



XII. 



Qui primum veritatis studio animum adiungit, ita com- 
paratus esse debet ut quasdam veritates per se evidentes 
admittat necesse est. 

XIII. 

Hinc non solum eos^ qui principium et fontem certitudi- 
nis humana3 in actu fidei csec2e, quam naturali veracitati 
nostrarum facultatum adbibeamus, reponant, sed etiam 
eos, qui veritatum omnium temporaneam quandam dubita- 
tionem statuant, a veritate discedere apparet. 

% 



9 

IX. 

The common sense of nature^liaving its origin in rational 
nature, rests upon sucli a principle, as cannot be subject to 
error. 



X. 



The motive by which the mind is necessitated to adhere 
to what is true, is found in evidence, which according to us 
consists altogether in the connection, which is perceived to 
exist either between different truths or the elements of one 
truth. 



XL 



Hence we may easily perceive that evidence is both ob- 
jective and subjective, metaphysical, physical and moral, 
immediate and mediate. 



XII. 



He who wishes to arrive at truth, must admit the neces- 
sity of some self-evident principles. 



XIII. 



Hence not only those err, who place the principle and 
source of human certainty in an act of blind faith, which we 
may make in the natural veracity of our faculties; but those 
likewise, who maintain the necessity of a temporary doubt 
of all truths. 



10 
XIV. 



Ad veritatem amplectendam nunquam induci possunt, qui 
de omnibus esse duLitandum contendentes, principia, quibus 
innititur demonstratio, sive sincere,, sive simulate e medio 
auferunt. 

XV. 

Quod ad methodum in scentiis tenendam pertinet, licet in 
forma totius disciplinte tradendae synthesim prsestantiorem 
esse ducamus, tamen in singulis qusestionibus explicandis 
modo synthesim, modo analysim iuxta rei opportunitatem 
et naturam adhibendam esse judicamus. 



11 

XIV. 

They can never be induced to embrace the truth ^ who 
contend that we must doubt of every thing, and thus de- 
stroy, whether in good faith or not, the principles on which 
demonstration rests. 

XV. 

As to the method to be followed in the study of the 
sciences, though we think Synthesis should be preferred, 
in arranging the order of a general course of instruction; 
however, in the explanation of single questions, we are of 
opinion that we should use,at one time. Synthesis, B.nd at an 
another, Analy sis, SLCCOidiiig to the subject of which we treat. 



1:^ 
EX 

ONTOLOGIA. 

XYI. 

Judicia quibus omnis ratiocinatio, superstruitur alia sunt 
rationalia, qu^e analytica audiunt, et tanquam communi 
lege eftXto repugnantiee continentur ; alia sunt experimen- 
talia^ quee generatim syntlietica dici possunt, et experientia 
vel observatione nituntur. 

XYII. 

Cum nihil aliud in obiecto insit pro iudiciis immediate 
ferendis nisi aut convenientia prsedicatum inter et subiectum 
necessario intercedenS; aut factum ipsum experientia com- 
pertum, indicia synthetica a priori in commentitiis haberi 

debent. 

XVIIl. 

In principio causalitatis quod enuntiatur — '- Omne quod 
fit liabet suicausam'" — cum idea praedicati in idea subjecti 
contineatur, effatum hoc non modo verum habendum, sed et 
inter veritates primas coUocandum est. 

XIX. 

Interna rerum possibilitas, per quam habilitas rei ad exi- 
stendum ex ipsa elementorum conditione orta intelligitur.a 
Dei essentia, ac divino intellectu dependet 



XX. 

Inter couceptus, quos a.nimus deprehendit, potissimum 



13 

ONTOLOGY/ 

XVI. 

Judgments, on which all reasoning is built, are either 
rational, which are called analytical, smd are reducible to the 
principle of contradiction ; or experimental which may in 
general be called synthetical, founded on experience or 
observation, 

XVII. 

Since in an object there is nothing to occasion an imme- 
diate judgment, excepting either the necessary agreement 
of the subject and predicate,or a fact made known by expe- 
rience, synthetical judgments apriori are to be regarded as 
commentitious. 

XVIII. 

The principle of causality — " Whatever is produced has 
its cause " — is not only true,but to be ranked among primary 
truths, because in it the idea of the predicate is contained in 
the idea of the subject. 

XIX. 

The internal possibility of things, by which is under- 
stood the hability of the thing to exist, arising from the con- 
dition of its elements, is not to be placed in the divine Om- 
nipotence or will, but in the essence of God and his Divine 
Intellect. 

XX. 

Among the conceptions of the mind^ the notions of sub- 



14 

eminent notiones substantive et caussej quarum altera non 
modificationum congerie, sed perceptione rei per se stantis 
constituitur; altera vero non commentitia haLenda est, sed 
realis, quas ex notione eventiis sen rei qii£e existere incipit, 
sese prodit. 

XXL 

Licet innumersB sint rerum essentise, quae nos latent, et 
plerveque sint,quarum imperfectam notitiam duntaxat habe- 
mus, tamen ex eis multae sunt qu£e reali, clara, et distincta 
ratione percipiuntur. 

XXIL 

Dogma quo sancitur creaturas omni activitate privari, 
merasque occasiones esse,quarum intuitu Deus unice omnia, 
qu» fiunt in rerum universitate, operatur, uti experientife 
ipsi, et divinse sapientiae contrarium, admitti nequit. 




15 

stance and cause are principally eminent: the former of 
which consists not in an assemblage of modifications but in 
the perception of a thing subsisting per se; and the latter is 
not to be held as commentitious,but real, and evolved from 
the notion of an event, that is to say, of a thing which 
begins to exist. 

XXI. 

Although there be innumerable essences of things which 
are hidden from us, and of many of which we have only an 
imperfect knowledge, yet there are many which are really, 
clearly, and distinctly perceived. 

XXII. 

The opinion of those who hold that creatures are destitute 
of all activity and that they are the mere occasions of God's 
operating all things that are done in the universe, being 
contrary to experience and repugnant to the divine wisdom, 
cannot be admitted. 




16 
EX 

COSMOLOGIA 

XXIII. 

Mundiim revera existere res est explorata, atque comper- 
tsi, cuius evidentia ita uniuscuiusque mens perstringitur, ut 
earn idealistae sive vulgares, sive transcendentales suis argu- 
tiis nunquam infirmare potuerint 

XXIV. 

Nisi pugnantia simul coniungere velimus^ mundum ut- 
pote qui contingens, compositus, mutabilis, ac finitus est, a 
Deo penitus discirminari fatendum est. 

XXV. 

Cum mundus eiusque materia vi naturae non extent, a 
Deo non emanatione, sed creatione libera prodiisse necesse 
est. 

XXVI. 

Tantum abest ut mundus sempitermus esse debuerit, ut ad 
factum quod attinet omnia quae afferri possunt eius recentem 
novitatem ostendant. 

XXVII. 

Etsi mundo absoluta in suo genere perfectio tribuenda est 
ipsum tamen omnium possibilium optimum iure meritoque 
inficiamur. 



.17 



COSMOLOGY. 

XXIII. 

That the world really exists is a thing certain, the evi- 
dence of which appears so forcibly to the mind, that the 
Idealists J whether of the Common or Transcendental ScJiooly 
could not by all their subtilities either weaken or des- 
troy it. 

XXIV. 

Unless we are willing to admit contradictory qualities in 
the same substance^ we must acknowledge that the world, 
being contingent, composed of parts, mutable and finite, is 
totally distinct from God. 

XXV. 

Inasmuch as the world and matter do not exist by their 
own nature, they must have proceeded from God by free 
Creation, and not by emanation. 

XXVI. 

The world is so far from being necessarily eternal, that 
in regard to the fact, all that can be adduced shows its re- 
cent origin. 

XXVIl. 

Although relative perfection may be attributed to the 
world, in so far as God, in creating it, has exactly attained 
his end; we may justly and reasonably deny that it is abso- 
lutely perfect 



1§ 

XXVIII. 

Cum leges naturae non adeo necessariae Deo sint, ut iis 
ab ipsarum auctore derogari non possit, miracula ob fines 
certe divina sapientia dignos, a Deo patrari posse patet. 



19 

XXVIII. 

Since the laws of nature are not so necessary but that an 
exception may be made to them by their Author, it is evi- 
dent that miracles may be performed by God for ends wor- 
thy of his Divine wisdom. 




20 
EX 

ANTHROPOLOGIA. 

XXIX. 

Inter facultates apprehensivas prima est sensibilitas, quae, 
ut in actum prodeat, organum rite dispositum, obiecti in- 
fluentis praesentiam, et huius accommodam cum sensoriis 
iunctionem, re'|uirit. 

XXX. 

Sensibilitatis actus neque cum impressione, quam externa 
in sensoriis obiecta faciunt, confundendus est, neque in fibril- 
larum motu, aut corporis constituendus temperamento, sed 
simplici quadam actione contineri dicendus est. 



XXXL 

Sensibilitatis actu non organicam impressionem, aut ima- 
ginem quamdam ab obiectis nobis immissam, sed obiecta ipsa 
extra nos posita quoad externas qualitates directe attingimus. 

XXXII. 

Imaginatione sensationes ante habitas cum earum obiecta 
absunt, vel actu sensus externos non afficiunt, reproducimus, 
vel ex lis quae sensibus alias usurpavimus totum conflamus, 
cui nullum prototypon respondet in natura. 

XXXIII. 

Licet tarn arcta inter imaginationem, et intelligentiam in- 
tercedat colligatio, ut una alteram assidue comitetur, tamen 



21 



ANTHROPOLOGY. 

XXIX. 

Among the apprehensive faculties the first is sensibility, 
which, in order to exercise its acts, requires that the bodily 
organs should be well disposed, that the influencing object 
should be present, and that there should be a suitable con- 
nexion between the latter and the sensoria. 

XXX. 

The act of sensibility is not to be confounded with the 
impression which external objects make upon the sensoria, 
nor to be placed in the movement of the fibres, or in the 
reaction of the brain, or in the temperament of the body, 
but consists in a simple action made known to us by expe- 
rience. 

XXXI. 

By the act of sensibility the objects themselves, as to 
their external qualities, are directly perceived ; not the or- 
ganic impression, nor an image sent to us by these objects. 

' XXXII. 

By the imagination sensations already experienced are 
reproduced, when their objects are absent or no longer affect 
our external senses ; or else, from the different objects we 
may have formerly perceived by the senses, a new object is 
composed, of which nature affords no prototype. 

XXXIII. 

Although there exists between the imagination and the 
intelligence so close a union, that the one always accompanies 



22 

imaginatione, utpote quae vim sentiendi non superat, opera- 
tiones intellectuales nunquam reproducere possumus. 

XXXIV. 

Praeter sensiles et alias extare in nobis facultates appre- 
hensivas, quae longissime a sensu se efferunt, in nos cogita- 
tionem revocantes facile detegimus. 

XXXV. 

Inter has facultates praecipuae sunt intelligentia, et ratio, 
quarum altera id simplici apprehensione, aut immediato 
iudicio apprehendit quod per se patet ; altera vero veritates 
alias ex aliis iam notis discurrendo rite deducit. 

XXXVI. 

Cum perspici animo nequeat duas inter sese vel dissidere 
vel congruere notiones nisi altera alteri componatur, ac vi- 
cissim veluti e regione utraque collocetur, iudicia compara- 
tionem semper aliquam implicant, praeeuntemque semper 
simplicem exquirunt apprehensionem, qua, quod comparatur, 
sit ante perspectum. 

XXXVII. 

Conscientia, cum semper relationem quamdam uti cogni- 
tam involvat, ad vim intellectualem non vero ad eensilem 
pertinet. 

XXXVIII. 

Conscientiae munus non in eo cernitur quod liniti, infiniti, 
et utriusque mutuae relationis referat notionem, sed in eo 
duntaxat quod intrinsecas cogitantis subiecti modificationes 
ac existentiam immediato perspiciat. 



23 

the other ; neverthelesa the imagination, as being a more 
sensible faculty, can never reproduce intellectual operations. 

XXXIV. 

By directing our attention to the internal operations of 
our own mind, we easily perceive that there exists in us, be- 
sides the sensible faculties, others also, which far surpass our 
senses. 

XXXV. 

Among these faculties the principal are intelligence and 
reason ; of which the former attains by simple apprehension, 
or by an immediate judgment, what is self-evident ; the latter 
by inference legitimately deduces other truths from those 
already known. 

XXXVI. 

As the mind cannot, in judging, perceive that two notions 
agree or disagree, unless both the one and the other be 
present and placed as it were in juxtaposition ; judgments 
always imply some comparison, and require that simple ap- 
prehension should precede ; by which, what is aredmpco 
may be previously apprehended. 

XXXVII. 

Conscience, as it always involves some relation already 
known, belongs to the intellectual, and not to the sensible 
faculty. 

XXXVIII. 

The office of conscience is not to give a notion of the 
finite and infinite, and of the mutual relation of the two, but 
immediately to perceive the existence of the thinking prin- 
ciple and its intrinsic modifications. • • 



24 

XXXIX. 

Cum ex facultatibus apprehensivis facultates expansivas 
derivare, easque congruere certum sit, patet et vim appe- 
tendi in nobis inveniri, eamque bifariam in sensilem et intel- 
lectualem esse partiendam, prout cognitio, ex qua proficisci- 
tur, sensilis sit vel intellectualis. 

XL. 

Vis autem haec quae rationem consequitur ut suo prin- 
cipio apprehensivo sit consentanea, vera indifferentiae liber- 
tate instrui debet. 



XLI. 

Animi cogitatio utpote quae nihil concretum, admixtum, 
copulatum et duplex babet, cum materia ita pugnat, ut ne 
divina quidem potentia inde efflorescere, aut in ea recipi 
possit. 

XLII. 
Hinc animum himianum nee corpus aliquod, nee partem 
corporis, nee qualitatem quae corpus afficiat, sed substan- 
tiam quamdam omnino simplicem esse patet. 

XLIIL 

Cum animi bumani cogitatio non modo simplex sit, verum 
etiam spiritualis, in quantum nimirum corporeum et sensilem 
penitus transcendat ambitum, animus humanus non solum 
simplex sed etiam spiritualis sit oportet. 



25 

XXXIX. 

Since it is certain that the appetitive follow the appre- 
hensive faculties, it is evident that there is in us an appetitive 
faculty, and that it must be divided into two species, sensible 
and intellectual^ accordingly as the knowledge from which it 
arises, is conveyed to us by the senses or the intelligence. 

XL. 

This faculty, which follows reason, that it may be in ac- 
cordance with its apprehensive principle, must be endowed 
with true liberty, which consists in this : that, all the condi- 
tions for action being supposed, the soul determines itself 
according to its own option ; that is to say, elicits the action, 
though it might have withheld it, or even elicited one of a 
contrary character. 

XLI. 

Thought having none of the properties of matter, such 
as extension, composition of parts, &c., is necessarily opposed 
and repugnant to it ; so that it could not, even by an act of 
the Divine omnipotence, proceed from it or be received into it. 

XLII. 

Hence the human soul is not matter, nor any modification 
or quality of matter, but an entirely simple substance. 

XLIII. 

Since thought is not only simple, but also spiritual, inas- 
much as it altogether transcends the sphere of the senses, 
the human soul, likewise, must not only be simple, but also 
spiritual. 



26 

XLIV. 

Animus humanus utpote qui independens a corpore exi- 
stit, nonnisi originem divinam, ncc nisi perpetuo duraturam 
vitam sibi vindicat. 

XLY. 

Quod ad animi humani cum corpore iunctioncm attinet, 
discrepantium philosophorum hypothesibus practermissis, 
unice asserimus animum vere et physice, atque nexu per- 
quam intimo corpori copulari ita ut una exinde substantia 
duabus quidem at non confusis inter se sed omnino distinctis 
partibus, animo scilicet et corpore, composita exurgat. 

XL VI. 

Ad idearum originem cxplicandam duplex elcmentum 
requiri ac sufficerc arbitramur : subiectivum alterum nempc 
intellectus vim, sive ingenitam inclinationem ad verum arri- 
piendum rite ipsi propositum : obiectivum alterum nempe 
cxperientiam cuius adminiculo obiecta ipsi repraescntantur, 
quibus positis, virtutc sibi propria omne cognitionum genus 
sibi cudit. 

XLVII. 

Ilinc neque Empiristis adscribimur, (|ui vi idolorum quo- 
rumdam in nos ex obiecto adventantium, aut sensationis ope, 
aut sensationis simul et reflexionis adminiculo idearum ori- 
ginem explicandam esse contendunt, neque adstipulamur 
Rationalistis, qui ingenitas ideas, vel transcendentalem 
idcalismum, vel identitatis absolutae intuitionem, vel uni- 
versalem rationem, vel formulam idealem obtrudunt. 



27 

xLiy. 

As the human soul exists independently of the body, it 
claims for itself no other than a divine origin and never- 
ending duration. 

XLV. 

With regard to the union of the human soul and body; we 
omit the discordant opinions of philosophers, and only assert, 
that the former is united to the latter truly, physically and 
by a most intimate union ; so that hence arises one substance, 
composed however of two parts wholly distinct, viz., the 
soul and the body. 

XLVI. 

To explain the origin of ideas, we think two elements 
requisite and sufficient — the one subjective^ namely, a power 
of the intellect, i. e., an innate inclination to embrace truth, 
whenever it is properly proposed to it ; the other objective^ 
viz., experience, by means of which, objects are represented 
to the mind, which, being represented, by its own power it 
works out every kind of knowledge. 

XLVII. 

Hence, we neither follow the Empirics^ who explain the 
origin of our ideas by certain forms or sensible images, 
coming to us from the objects themselves, or else by the aid 
of sensation alone, or by sensation and reflection together ; 
nor do we agree with the Rationalists^ in their different 
theories of innate ideas, transcendental idealism, the intu- 
ition of absolute identity, universal reason, or the ideal 
formula. 



28 

XLYIII. 

Universales ideae, quae cum collectivis non confundendae 
sunt, nee rebus ipsis, quae tantum exhibent fundamentum, 
nee solum nominibus, quae idearum signa sunt, continentur, 
sed in mentalibus conceptibus reperiuntur. 




29 

XLVIII. 

Universal ideas, which are not to be confounded with 
collective ideas, are not contained in things, except as regards 
their objective conception, nor in names alone, which are the 
mere signs of ideas, but exist in the conceptions of the mind. 





30 
EX 

THEOLOGIA NATURALI. 

XLIX. 

Dei existentia ex primis intelligentiae principiis sic deduci- 
tur, ut nemo rationis compos earn ignorare posse videatur. 



L. 



Quantum intelligentiae nostrae sinunt angustiae id de 
divina natura definimus ut Deus ens Supremum, a se neces- 
sario extans, infinitum, perfectissimum, summaque simplici- 
tate fruens esse dicatur. 

LI. 

Dei existentia cum eius unitate ita connectitur ut idem 
ferme sit plures Deos comminisci ac nullum adstruere. 

LII. 

Hinc facile admodum est colligere non modo Polythei- 
stas plures Deos fingentes, sed etiam Manicliaeos principium 
summe bonum, ac summe malum adstruentes, a veritate 
vehementer aberrare. 

LIII. 

Cum realitates omnes, quae in ente necessario reperiuntur, 
ex necessitate insint, nee ulla earum amitti, aut nova aliqua 
adscititia perfectio adiungi possit, Deum nulli esse obnoxium 
mutationi, evidenter elucet. 



31 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

XLIX. 

The existence of God is so easily deduced from the first 
principles of the intelligence, that it seems impossible for a 
rational being to be ignorant of it. 

L. 

As far as the limits of our intelligence permit, we define, 
with regard to the Divine nature, that God is a Supreme 
Being, necessarily self-existent, infinite, most perfect, and 
possessing complete simplicity. 

LI. 

The existence of God is so connected with his unity, that 
to admit a plurality of divinities, is to deny the existence of 
a Supreme Being. 

LII. 

Hence we easily perceive the error of the Polytheists, who 
held the existence of many Gods, and also of the Maniche- 
ans, who admitted two supreme principles, one good and the 
other bad. 

LIIL 

Since, in a necessary being, every reality is absolutely ne- 
cessary, and since he can neither lose any perfection nor 
receive any, it is evident that God is immutable. 



32 
LIV. 

Dei aeternitas cum ipsius necessitate existendi adeo arctis 
nexibus iungitur ut una sine altera esse non possit. 

LV. 

Cum infinitum limitibus circumscribi nequeat, modus ille 
existendi perfectissimus qui exquirit ut Deus ubique sit prae- 
sens, ac substantia sua omnia quae creari possunt veluti 
permeare potis sit, Deo competere dicendus est. 

LVI. 

Deum intelligentia scientiaque esse praeditum, qua non 
seipsum modo, sed et cetera omnia uno intuitu comprehendit, 
ex hoc elucet quod omni numero absoluta fruatur spirituali- 
tate. 

LYII. 

Cum voluntas ex intelligentia resultet, ea in Deo admitti 
debet, non instar potentiae quae ex superaddita actione per- 
ficiatur, sed tamquam actus completissimus, atque unicus, 
quo Deus seipsum ceu obiectum primarium, alia vero a se 
distincta ut obiecta secundaria prosequatur. 

LVIII. 

Neque tamen ex eo quod idem sit divinae voluntatis actus, 
quo se et cetera a se distincta velit, fas est unquam inferre 
Deum quemadmodom se ipsum, ita et cetera omnia necessario 
velle, neque ex eo quod ea quae libere prosequitur muta- 
tioni iugiter sint obnoxia, mutationem ullam in libera Dei 
volitione adstruere licet. 



33 

LIV. 

The eternity of God is so closely united with the necessity 
of his existence, that the one cannot be conceived without 
the other. 

LY. 

Since what is infinite has no limits, we must attribute to 
God that most perfect mode of existence, which requires that 
he should be everywhere present, and pervade by his sub- 
stance all things that may be created. 

LVI. 

As God is absolutely spiritual, he possesses intelligence 
and knowledge, by which with one view he comprehends 
himself and all things. 

LVII. 

Since will results from intelligence, it must be admitted 
in God, not as a "potentia," to be perfected by action, but 
as "unicus actus," most complete, by which God wills him- 
self as a primary object, and other things distinct from 
himself as secondary objects. 

LVIII. 

However, because by one and the same act of the Divine 
will God wills himself, and other things distinct from himself, 
we must not infer that, as God wills himself necessarily, so 
he wills all other things in the same manner ; nor because 
those things which he freely wills are subject to change, can 
we assert any change in the free volition of God. 
3 



84 

LIX. 

Cum Deus absoluta undique gaudeat existentia, quae cum 
re nulla sibi externa nectitur, actio ilia, quae nullam prae- 
iacentem materiam postulat ei ita competit ut cum nullo 
eflSciente finite possit esse communis. 

LX. 

Creaturae omnes ita necessario a Deo dependent, ut 
neque in semel accepta existentia absque immediate divino 
voluntatis influxu perseverare, neque ullam absque imme- 
diate divino concursu exerere possint actionem, 

LXI. 

Universa, quae in mundo sunt, divina ditione sic tenentur, 
ac providentia gubernantur, ut praeter supremi moderatoris 
voluntatem aut permissionem nihil centingat. 



S5 

LIX. 

Since God possesses absolute existence, unconnected with 
anything external, that action which requires no pre-existent 
subject, viz., creation, is so peculiarly his, that it can never 
be common to him and any finite cause. 

LX. 

All creatures are so necessarily dependent upon God, that 
they can neither persevere in the existence they have once 
received, without being constantly preserved by a positive 
influence of the Divine will, nor can they elicit any action, 
without God's immediate concurrence. 

LXI. 

As all things in the world are subject to God's dominion, 
and governed by his providence, nothing can happen, but by 
the will or permission of the sovereign ruler. 



r^r^jS^M^^sJ^ \^@A^L9X'\y^ 



EX 

ETHICA. 

LXII. 

Homo ita natura sua est comparatus ut nee ad obiecta ap- 

petenda, nisi ex boni ratione incitetur, nee ad bonum vi 

naturae feratur nisi sit omnibus absolutum numeris, omnique 

careat defectu. 

LXIII. 

Perfecta et adaequata felicitas hominis neque in animi cor- 
porisque voluptate, neque in divitiis, honoribusque, neque 
in scientia, et virtute ipsa, sed in solo Deo perfectissimo ac 
infinito bono inveniri potest. 

LXIV. 

Dantur nonnullae actiones rectae vel pravae secundum na- 
turam ante omnem positivam legem praecipicntem vel pro- 
hibentem. 

LXV. 

Aliqua sapientiae divinae ratio in Deo ab aeterno ad- 
struenda est, quam legem aeternam nuncupamus. 

LXVI. 

Huius autem aeternae legis participatio quaedam in 
bomine reperitur, quam merito legem naturalem, utpote 
quae natura indita est, appellaveris. 

LXVII. 

Lex naturalis non solum est indeficiens, et immutabilis, 
sed etiam quoad eius generaliora principia adeo per se per- 
spioua, ut a nemine invincibilitor ignorari possit. 



87 



ETHICS. 

LXII. 

Man is naturally so constituted, that he is not impelled to 
seek objects, unless sub ratione honi; nor is he impelled by 
nature towards what is good, unless it be complete and 
without defect. 

LXIII. 

The adequate and perfect felicity of man can neither be 
found in spiritual enjoyment, nor in sensual pleasures, nor 
in riches and honors, nor in science and virtue itself, but in 
God, who alone is most perfectly and infinitely good. 

LXIV. 

There are some actions intrinsically and essentially good 
or bad, independently of every positive law preceptive or 
prohibitive. 

LXV. 

We must admit in God, from eternity, that " ratio divinae 
sapientiae,'' which is commonly called the eternal law. 

LXVI. 

Of this eternal law there is a participation in man, which, 
being implanted in his nature, is justly called natural law. 

LXVII. 

This natural law is not only indefectible and immutable, 
but also, as to its more general principles, so clear and 
manifest of itself, that no one can be invincibly ignorant of 
it. 



88 

Lxvm. 

Naturae lex praemiisj et poenis, quae futurum aevum 
praesertim respiciunt, a Deo sancita est, et communita. 

LXIX. 

Primum ac generalissimum legis naturalis principium, ad 
quod cetera reduci possunt in ordine, obiectivo rerum sectando 
actibus liberis reperiri affirmamus. 

LXX. 

Tenentur singuli homines tarn internunij quam externum 
cultum Deo exhibere. 

LXXI. 

Supernaturalis revelatio ilia, qua quae ex naturae contem- 
platione non efflorescunt veritates^ humanse divinitus pate- 
scant intelligentiae possibilis est. 

LXXII. 

Quod dim ferebat Stoicorum opinio, recentiusque ^'Syste- 
matis naturae auctor" obtrudere conatus est, sapientem, vi- 
delicet, si id tempora persuadeant, seipsum interimendo 
sponte e vita migrare posse, apertissima falsitate turpatur. 

LXXIII. 

Adversari naturali legi Monomachia dicenda est qua duo 
designate tempore in unum coeunt locum, ut, privata quod 
auritatecto suscipiunt, singular! certamine congrediantur. 



89 

LXVIII. 

The law of nature is sanctioned and secured by God with 
rewards and punishments, which especially regard a future 
life. 

LXIX. 

We affirm that the first and general principle of the 
natural law, to which the others can be reduced, is to be 
found in this, that we follow and observe in our free actions 
the objective order of things. 

LXX. 

The external worship of God is no less the duty of man, 
than the internal. 

LXXI. 

It is not impossible, that God should make a supernatural 
revelation to man of truths which cannot be deduced from 
the contemplation of nature. 

LXXII. 

The ancient opinion of the Stoics, which the "Author of 
the System of Nature" has recently endeavored again to put 
forth, viz : that it is lawful in certain circumstances to de- 
prive one's self of life, is evidently false. 

LXXIIL 

Duelling, by which two persons, having fixed a time and 
place, meet in single combat undertaken by private autho- 
rity, must be held as repugnant to the law of nature. 



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